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Zakaria Babutsidze 
ABSTRACT
We extend the Bertrand duopolistic competition to include captives. These are 
consumers that have no choice between the suppliers. Usual population of 
shoppers are modeled performing a sequential search in order to decide where 
to buy a homogenous good. These two simple departures from the original 
setup have sharp consequences. First, we find that duopolistic price 
competition is not robust to inclusion of captives. The equilibrium results 
starkly differ and the only possible equilibrium now includes duopolists 
charging monopolistic prices. Second, addition of sequential search introduces 
multiplicity of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In this setup, we observe perverse 
optimal response to competitors price changes. Notably, we find that the firm 
might want to reduce the price in response to the competitors price increase, 
which is at odds with the usual undercutting principle. Third, we investigate the 
behavior of equilibrium prices depending on the heterogeneity in consumer risk 
attitudes. We find that the higher consumer heterogeneity with respect to 
acceptance of risky gambles leads to higher prices in equilibrium.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the standard Bertrand competition consumers choose the cheapest prod-
uct available on the market. All consumers can perfectly observe prices in 
all shops and are allowed to make the purchase from any of the suppliers. 
In reality, it is impossible to find such a situation. It is hard for the con-
sumers to know prices in all shops in order to make perfectly informed 
decision. Moreover, not all consumers will have an opportunity to make 
the purchase from any of the shops. Up to date, it is not well understood 
how the predictions of the standard duopolistic price competition model 
change after these fairly minor alterations.
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In this paper, we present the model that introduces two extensions to the
Bertrand setup. First, we assume the existence of captives. Akin to the pre-
vious work by Wilde and Schwartz (1979) and Varian (1980), we assume
some of the consumers do not have the choice between the two sellers. They
have to stick to one of them even if the price it charges is higher than the
competitors price. However, unlike Wilde and Schwartz (1979) and Varian
(1980), who assume that population of captives is randomly distributed
across the firms each period, we assume that this distribution is stable.
Meaning, that there is a constant market structure dictating that consumer
s is a captive of firm i. And this structure is known to the sellers. This is a
fairly plausible assumption for many products that are routinely acquired in
neighborhood shops. The remainder of the consumers behaves like standard
Bertrand consumers. They have access to both shops. We refer to these con-
sumers as shoppers. We can think of them as people living on the border
between neighborhoods and having a choice between the two shops.
The second altercation of the setup is that we oblige shoppers to enter
the shops sequentially. Going to the shop is the only way to obtain the
information about the price charged by a given producer. In light of this
requirement we discuss two versions of the model. One, where shoppers are
allowed to visit both shops and then decide where to buy. We refer to this
as the return option. The other, where shoppers have no return option.
In this case, even though they can theoretically enter both shops, they can-
not go back to the shop to make a purchase, once they have exited it. In
this case shoppers have to take the decision under incomplete information.
This is also a plausible assumption for large number of cases where visiting
the next shop is costless, while going back to the shop you already visited
is not. Consider walking down the shopping street in one direction. Or
shopping for gasoline on your way to work.
These two alterations call for the change in the approach to the problem.
First, introducing captives with the stable temporal structure, makes it pos-
sible to describe the market using buyer–seller networks (Kranton and
Minehart, 2001; Corominas-Bosch, 2004). We have two sellers—firm 1 and
firm 2—and three types of buyers: shoppers, that are connected to both of
the firms, and captives of each of the two firms, who are connected to only
one of the firms. Contributions in networked markets literature are mostly
concerned with bargaining and use bipartite (Lever, 2011), or even tripar-
tite (Blume et al., 2009) networks where additional traders are introduced
in the model. Second, the introduction of the return option (or rather the
instance when shoppers have no return option), turns the model into a
well-developed price search setup (Stigler, 1961; Manning and Morgan,
1982).
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Few of works related to ours, like Lever (2011) and Pasini et al. (2008),
discuss the mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For obtaining meaningful
results these models strive for unique equilibrium. This usually involves
additional constraints on demand functions and results into an equilibrium
in randomized (mixed) strategies. This approach is justified in their case
because they are concerned with the analysis of welfare, which is dubious
in case of multiplicity of equilibria. Due to the existence of captives, Ber-
trand setup discussed in this paper becomes a discontinuous game. This
complicates significantly the analysis of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
(Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986; Reny, 1999). Therefore, we follow the
classical works in the discipline (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977, 1982; Stahl,
1996) and concentrate on pure strategy Nash equilibria of the proposed
pricing game.
We find that the introduction of captives in the price competition frame-
work changes the outcomes drastically. First, in the setup when consumers
have the return option, which is the equivalent to the classical Bertrand set-
up except the existence of captives, there exists no pure strategy Nash equi-
librium (PSNE) for an extensive parameter set. Even more surprisingly, for
the parameter set where PSNE does exist, the equilibrium it is character-
ized by the monopolistic prices instead of the pricing at marginal cost. Sec-
ond, once no return option is imposed, the possibility of the multiplicity of
the PSNE arises. We find the possibility of price dispersion in equilibrium
of the duopolistic pricing game. We find incentives for un-orthodox price
responses by the firms. Notably, we find that the optimal response from the
firm to competitors price increase might as well be lowering of the price.
We also investigate the consequence of the consumer heterogeneity with
respect to risk attitudes in their price-search process. We find that the
higher heterogeneity leads to higher prices in equilibrium. This sheds a new
light at the duopolistic price competition setup.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections
3 and 4 present the results of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
Consider the market where two firms (i5 1, 2) are engaging in price com-
petition. Profit-maximizing firms use the same constant returns to scale
technology and produce a homogenous good. The unit/marginal cost of
production is c, and it can be paid after sales. The homogenous product is
indivisible. There are S consumers in the economy. Each of them is
endowed with funds in amount of m. Consumers can only buy one unit of
905
the product. They can spend all the money for a unit of product, but prefer
spending as little as possible.1
Distinctive from the original Bertrand setup, we assume that each con-
sumer can either go to one of the shops/producers, or go to both of them.
Denote the number of captives of the shop 1 by U1 and the number of cap-
tives of the shop 2 by U2. Remaining S5S2U12U2 consumers are shop-
pers and thus have access to both shops. Only the shoppers can choose
between the offers in two shops.
Shoppers make trips to the shops sequentially. The sequence is chosen
randomly for every shopper in every period. We further assume that this
market structure (U1, U2 and S) is known to duopolists. Naturally the mar-
ket structure is the major consideration when taking the pricing decision.
Without loss of generality, for exposition of the results in the paper we will
assume that if U1 6¼ U2, then U1 > U2. We also assume that there always
are some shoppers (S> 0).
As all results are scale free, it is convenient to normalize the size of con-
sumer populations. For this, we use the number of shoppers (S) as the
denominator and define ui5Ui=S. In what follows we analyze two variants
of the model. One where shoppers have option to return to the producer
they have already visited. The other when they have no return option. In
the former case, they purchase the product from the shop with the lowest
price. In the latter case, this is not necessarily true. In this situation shop-
pers have to make the decision on where to purchase the product after they
have observed only one (rather than both) of the prices.
3. SEQUENTIAL TRIPS WITH RETURN OPTION
In order to set the benchmark for the more interesting setup with no
return option for shoppers, we first analyze the version of the model when
shoppers can choose the cheapest product offered by the two suppliers.
Recall that in our model there are three groups of consumers. Technically,
there are three distinct submarkets and both of the firms have certain freedom
to exercise their monopolistic power in one of the three submarkets. They com-
pete only on common/shared submarket (for shoppers). In the situation when
shoppers can go back to the shop that they have already visited, the
1 For demonstration purposes, we can assume that utility function of consumer s has the fol-
lowing form Vs5v1dsðm2psÞ, where ds 2 f0; 1g denotes the consumption of the agent, ps 2
fp1; p2g is the price she has paid for the product, m is his endowment in monetary terms, v is
a parameter. It is easy to see that this functional form satisfies all the requirements we have
outlined above.
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competition on shared submarket collapses to classical Bertrand setup. The
problem that producers are facing is that they cannot price discriminate, and
thus they have to charge one price for both submarkets they operate on.
Proposition 1: If 0 < u1 < mc 21, and u1 > u2, then there is no Pure
Strategy Nash Equilibrium in the economy.
Proof: Conditions state that there should be at least one captive in the
economy and that the share of captives for each of the competitors should
not be too high in order not to discourage duopolists to engage in compe-
tition for shoppers. In this situation, prices behave similar to how they
would behave in Bertrand model before converging to the equilibrium.
Starting from the monopolistic price we will observe a downward spiral.
However, due to existence of captives, as price becomes too low firms will
have incentive to give up the competition for shoppers and extract monop-
olistic profit from captives. As a result, prices never reach c (as it is always
strictly dominated by m) which is the only candidate for PSNE as it is the
only price that cannot be profitably undercut. 
Remark 1: If 0 < u1 < mc 21, and u1 > u2, then prices are confined to
the interval c1 mu111u1 ;m
h i
.
In order to see this, consider that there are two reasonable responses to
competitors price. One is to undercut his price by infinitesimally small val-
ue  (similar to Bertrands original model). The other is to abandon compe-
tition for shoppers and extract monopolistic profit from captives, thus
charging m. This is a direct consequence of existence of captives.
In the first scenario, firms profit is pci5ðS1UiÞðpi2cÞ. In the second sce-
nario, the profit is pmi 5Uim. If prices spiral down below
pi5c1
mui
11ui
; pmi > p
c
i , it is optimal for the firm to jump to charging m con-
centrating on captives. At this point the competitors best response is to
follow and change m2.
In order to determine which of the two competitors will abandon the
shared market first we calculate
@pi
@ui
5 12 uið11uiÞ2
 
m > 0. We see that cut-off
price is increasing in the number of captives. Therefore, the firm with the
higher share of captives will jump to the monopolistic price first. Thus, the
prices will never go down below the cutoff price of the firm with more cap-
tives, which as per our assumption is firm 1. The condition u1 < mc 21
ensures that the interval c1 mu111u1 ;m
h i
is of a positive length in order to
have room for undercutting.
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Despite being different from Bertrands conclusions, these results are in line
with previous literature. There are two aspects to draw parallels here. The first
is that the prices are constrained strictly above marginal cost, which echoes the
result by Stahl (1996). The second is that in no PSNE situations the likely price
dynamics is a perpetual cycle. Starting from the monopolistic price m, they
gradually go down as firms undercut each other until they go so low that one
of the firms increases the price to monopolize unique consumers. The competi-
tor follows and sets the price high enough to engage the first firm into price
cutting again. Similar result has been obtained by Salop and Stiglitz (1977).
On the other hand, if there are too many captives in the economy, the
competition might be discouraged. In this case, the economy has PSNE.
Proposition 2: If u1  mc 21, and u1 > u2, then the equilibrium is p15m
and p25m2.
Proof: In this situation, too large share of population is captive and as
a result firm 1 has no incentive to engage in competition. It is a dominant
strategy for firm 1 to charge the monopolistic price m. Responding to this
the competitor slightly undercuts the monopolistic price to capture shared
consumers. None of the firms have any incentive to deviate from such an
arrangement. 
Before going into more interesting case of no return option for shoppers,
notice that the model discussed in this section is a simply extension of the
original Bertrand setup. The only feature added is the existence of captives.
Yet, this simple modification (addition of even just one captive) has
changed the outcomes of the model dramatically. So much so that in the
only possible equilibrium case prices converge to the monopolistic price
rather than to the marginal cost.
4. SEQUENTIAL TRIPS WITH NO RETURN OPTION
In the version of the model analyzed in previous section, shoppers choose
the cheapest option available. In this section, we analyze a variant of the
model where consumers do not have an option to go back to the shop that
they have already visited. This modification induces shoppers to decide
where to purchase in presence of incomplete information. Effectively they
have to take the decision after seeing only one price. This substantially
alters the results of the model.
Obtaining complete information about the prices in the economy might
be costly. Consumers might have to engage in price search in order to
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identify the cheapest shop. In economics literature typically there are two
types of search rules are considered: sequential search (Benhabib and Bull,
1983) and fixed sample size non-sequential search (Manning and Morgan,
1982). However, several papers have identified search strategies that domi-
nate these two.2
The model herein can be interpreted as the one assuming imperfect ratio-
nality in consumer behavior. This is, in fact the consequence of not explicit-
ly modelling the search costs. Perfectly rational consumers would have to
weight potential gains from further information search again the costs
associated with this process, which our consumers do not do. However, this
imperfect rationality in consumer search is not novel. In fact marketing sci-
entists have been studying this behavior on the example of the
consideration set effect (Mehta et al., 2003), that is equivalent of the fixed
sample size search in economics. Besides, marketing research has also iden-
tified that informational motives of consumer search are regularly dominat-
ed by other (recreational) motives (Bloch et al., 1986). This would make
actual consumer search seem less-than-perfectly rational for an economists
taste, much like consumers in our model.
Our concern is with the sequential search. The seminal contribution in
this area is due Stigler (1961). He has demonstrated that it is optimal for
consumers to decide whether to continue the search for the best offer every
time they receive the quote. Building on Stiglers work, Kohn and Shavell
(1974) have demonstrated that sequential search would result in a switch-
point level of price. This means that consumer would terminate the search
as soon as a price quote would fall below this threshold level. Kohn and
Shavell (1974) have also demonstrated the uniqueness of this threshold.
In this paper, we adopt this sequential threshold search approach. We
assume consumers cannot obtain quotes without going to the shop in per-
son. In the original description, when consumers decide to terminate their
search, they can choose to buy from the cheapest shop they have visited
during the search process. However, in certain cases this is not very
realistic.
Consider a long street which has two gas stations in either end of it. If a
person wants to top up her tank, she has to decide while being close to the
street end. Some consumers live on the street. Therefore, going to work
every morning they pass only one of the gas stations. Consumers who have
to drive east to work can be U1, while the consumers who have to drive
west can be U2. These consumers get one quote each and they have to buy
2 For the review of these works see Morgan and Manning (1985).
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from the respective gas stations, because driving to the other end of the
street is simply too costly (imagine its a busy long street).
However, there are consumers who do not live on this street, but they
have to pass it while going to work. These are consumers belonging to set
S. They get price quotes from both gas stations, but they can buy only
from the one. And as driving from one gas station to the other is costly
they are not free of choosing the cheapest shop even if they have complete
information about the prices. Consider the decision this type of consumer
has to make. She arrives on the street and passes the first gas station. She
can stop and buy gas. However, if she decide not to do so, she has to buy
gas from the station at the other end of the street. Even if gas there is more
expensive she cannot turn and drive all the way back to the first gas sta-
tion. This might be too costly.
This behavior is not unique to gas stations. Many of us do our weekly
shopping in two supermarkets. We only buy part of our shopping list in the
first super market leaving the other part for the next shop. However, it is
perhaps a negligible share of us who would go back to the first shop to buy
a single item that she found to be more expensive in the second shop.
This is the consumer behavior we model in this section. We consider con-
sumers following simple rule of thumb in their purchases. Each of them
has an idiosyncratic thresholds p^s, such that as soon as the price she sees in
the first shop she enters p  p^s, she buys the product.3 If the first shop
charges higher price she takes a chance of buying the product in the second
shop. The optimality of the threshold approach in our framework is dem-
onstrated in the Appendix.
Notice that because consumers do not have a return option, they are
essentially taking a gamble. If the price in the first shop is too high to their
taste, they gamble on the price in the second shop. This gamble might pay
off, if the second shop they visit charges lower price. But they might have
to pay even higher price in the second shop. Therefore, p^s is a measure of
the risk attitude of consumer s. If p^s is low, consumer takes riskier gambles.
Consider p^s is distributed over S with a certain probability density func-
tion f ðÞ. Then, the corresponding cumulative distribution function at point
p, F(p), gives the share of shoppers for whom p^s < p. Thus, we can con-
clude that F(p) share of consumers that will enter the given shop first, will
not buy the product from this shop and will gamble on the price charged
3 Idiosyncrasy of thresholds can be due to multiple reasons. For example, consumers might
be heterogeneous in their risk attitudes, they (depending on their occupation) might have dif-
ferent value for time, or, relating to the earlier gasoline shopping example, they might have
different transportation costs (depending on the car they drive).
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by the second shop. This, in return implies that 12FðpÞ share these con-
sumers will buy the product from this shop. In the case when profit func-
tions for producers can be written as
pi5
S
2
12FðpiÞ1FðpjÞ
 
1Ui
 
ðpi2cÞ (1)
where i5 1, 2 and j5 2, 1.
In order to discuss the implications of this kind of behavior, we analyze
two setups. One where consumers are homogenous with regard to p^s, or
their risk attitudes, the other where they are heterogenous. In fact the for-
mer setup is only a limiting case of the latter, but it helps to demonstrate
few important implications of the model in a simpler arrangement.
4.1 Homogenous consumers
We start off with the simple case where consumers are homogenous with
respect to their risk attitudes. This means that c < p^s5l < m; 8s. The value
of l measures the risk attitudes of the society as a whole—the higher the l,
the less risk-taking is the society.
In order to characterize the equilibria of this game consider the
following.
Remark 2: No matter the price charged by the competitor and the mar-
ket structure, it is never optimal to charge pi 2 ½c; lÞ [ ðl;mÞ.
If S5 0, we know that the optimal policy is to charge p5m. However, if
S> 0 we have to discuss two components of the interval separately. We
know that firms want to extract maximum possible profit from captives.
Therefore, for those consumers they would prefer charging as high prices
as possible. For half of the shoppers the shop i will be the first shop they
visit. They will buy from the shop i as long as pi  l, they will not buy
from the shop otherwise. On the other hand, shoppers for whom the shop i
will be the second shop (and who have not bought the product in the shop
they entered first) will always buy the product no matter the price. There-
fore, no matter the price charged by the competitor, shop i will have two
possible strategies: either maintain the shoppers entering the shop first or
give them up. If a firm wants to maintain these shoppers it is clearly subop-
timal to charge any price lower than l. If the firm is ready to give them up,
it is suboptimal to charge a price lower than m.
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Therefore, in homogenous consumer case without return option we have
only two possible candidates for the equilibrium price—l and m. Hence,
we can have only tree kinds of pure strategy Nash equilibria: (1) where
both firms charge m, (2) where both firms charge l and (3) where one of
the firms charges l while the other charges m.
Denote m2c  r and l2c  r0. Note that r0 is linearly related to l, and
therefore r0 also measures the shoppers risk attitudes.
Proposition 3: If r0  121ui11ui r; 8i, then p15p25m is an equilibrium of the
game.
The proof of the proposition is straight forward as the incentive we have
to exclude is any of the firms wanting to jump down to l.
Proposition 4: If r0  ui1
21ui
r; 8i, then p15p25l is an equilibrium of the
game.
The proof of this proposition is similarly simple. These results point to
the fact that more risky consumers (lower r0) imply higher equilibrium pri-
ces in the economy.
Proposition 5: If
1
21u2
11u2
r  r0  u11
21u1
r and u1 > u2, then p15m and p25l is
the equilibrium of the game.
The proof of this proposition is also straight forward as it is sufficient to
ensure that firm 1 does not have an incentive to decrease the price to l and
that firm 2 does not to have an incentive to charge the monopolistic price.
This is quite interesting as the model implies the price dispersion, a widely
observed phenomenon on actual retail markets (Baye et al., 2004; Barron
et al., 2004), in the equilibrium of a simple duopolistic setup.
Proposition 5 implies that the shop with larger number of captives
charges the higher price. This is intuitive as the shop with more captives
has to incur larger costs (in form of profits given up) for lowering the price.
While for the firm with lower u, shoppers will be of greater importance,
therefore, it will be willing to fiercely high for them by price cutting.
The summary of the results with homogenous consumers can be seen on
figure 1. In this figure, r
0
r is measured on the ordinate and u1 and u2 are
measured on abscissa. In this space, the market setup can be represented
by two points on the same horizontal line, left one corresponding to firm 2
and the right one corresponding to firm 1. Note that the low values of r
0
r
mean that the society is more risk-taking.
We have three regions on the figure. 1f the market setup is such that
both firms are in the region below both curves—both firms are charging
monopolistic price p15p25m, this is the unique equilibrium. If market
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arrangement puts both firms above both curves—firms are charging
p15p25l. If both firms are in the middle region both type (i) and type (ii)
equilibria are possible. If market arrangement is such that only one of the
firms is placed in the region between the two curves there exists no pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. If one of the firm falls below both of the curves
and the other above both of them then we have the unique equilibrium
with a price dispersion: the firm above the two curves charges l while the
firm below the curves charges m. In order to understand why this is the
case, note that being below both of the curves means that the firm has rela-
tively high share of shoppers. In general, we can see that riskier consumers
induce higher prices in the economy.
4.2 Heterogenous consumers
If there is some variance is shoppers risk attitudes, the model requires
more elaboration. Firms profit functions are given by (1). We need to
derive the best response functions for each of the firms. For this, we need
to maximize profits by choosing pi under the condition that pi 2 ½c;m.
The first order condition for maximizing profits in the interior of the
interval ½c;m is
@pi
@pi
5
S
2
12Fðpi Þ1FðpjÞ
 	
1Ui2
S
2
f ðpi Þ½pi 2c50
Figure 1. Summary of the results with homogenous consumers.
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where pi represents the value of pi maximizing pi in the interior of interval
½c;m. This condition can be rewritten as
Fðpi Þ1f ðpi Þðpi 2cÞ5112ui1FðpjÞ (2)
Solving equation (2) pi will give the reaction function of firm i as a func-
tion of the price charged by firm j (pj). The solution in implicit form is
impossible, however, we can characterize the reaction of a firm to its com-
petitors actions.
Remark 3: In most of the cases, the higher price from the competitor
implies the higher price for the firm (as long as the price has not hit the
boundary at m). However, if f 0ðpi Þ < 22 f ðp

i Þ
pi 2c
, the higher price from the
competitor calls for the decrease of the price of firm i.
For deriving the response of pi to changes in pj in the interior of the inter-
val ½c;m, we can differentiate equation (2) with respect to pj. This results into
@pi
@pj
5
f ðpjÞ
2f ðpi Þ1f 0ðpi Þðpi 2cÞ
(3)
Given that f ðÞ is a probability density function, it is never negative. The
only way for the differential to be negative is for the denominator to be
negative.
This is an intriguing result. It implies that in certain situations firm
behavior will starkly contrast undercutting. Instead of increasing the price
in response to price hike by the competitor, it is optimal for the firm to
lower its price. In order to understand the intuition behind this result
notice that there are two mechanisms at work for increasing firms profits.
Increasing the price helps profits as it extracts more revenue from captives
as well as well as from shoppers who entered the competitors shop first
and decided not to buy there. Lowering the price, on the other hand, allows
the firm to capture more shoppers who entered its shop first. If the second
effect dominates the first, it is optimal for the firm to lower the prize
retaining larger number of shoppers.
Remark 3 also gives us the hint of when such situation might occur. For
this to happen f 0ðpi Þ should take a large negative value. This happens on a
steeply downward sloping portions of the probability density function.
This is intuitive, as in these areas a small price decrease results into a sub-
stantial increase in captured shoppers. For other situations, the reaction
function implies more conventional response to competitors price changes.
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At this point, we have to point out that equation (1) and the analysis of
this section so far is only a partial view. It takes into account only the pos-
sibility of continuous price adjustments within the boundaries of the inter-
val ½c;m. However, as already seen in this paper, in this model the optimal
response might be a discrete jump to the monopolistic price even in the
interior of the interval. This would also imply a discrete jump from pi to
pmi 5 Ui1
S
2
FðpjÞ

 
ðm2cÞ (4)
The jump in reaction function will occur when pmi > p

i . Which implies the
condition:
12Fðpi Þ
 ðpi 2cÞ < 2ui1FðpjÞ ðm2pi Þ (5)
If the inequality (5) is satisfied, the firm i is better off charging m.
This possible discontinuity complicates more detailed analysis of the
model. Models behavior depends on the form of f ðÞ, which makes it
impossible to characterize equilibria of the game for a general functional
form. However, significant insight can be drawn even from the specific dis-
tribution of f ðÞ. In order to obtain analytic results, in what follows, we
assume that thresholds are distributed uniformly along some interval ½a; b.
This allows for the analytical solution for the reaction function and for the
discussion of the economic effects of consumer heterogeneity with respect
to risk attitudes. Even in such a restrictive case the model delivers impor-
tant insight into the implication of the general setup.
We concentrate on the effects risk-taking behavior on equilibrium prices.
In particular, we concentrate on the effects of the average threshold across
consumers which represents a measure of the average risk-lovingness in the
society. Recall that the lower p^s implies that consumer will turn down lower
prices in the first shop taking on the gamble on prices she will see in the
second shop. The mean of our distribution is a monotonically increasing
function of ða1bÞ. We also examine how the heterogeneity in risk attitudes
across population affects equilibrium prices. The heterogeneity can be mea-
sured by the variance of our distribution, which is a monotonically increas-
ing function of ðb2aÞ.
In case of the uniform distribution, p^s  Uða; bÞ, the cumulative distribu-
tion function is Fðp^sÞ5 p^s2ab2a . Notice that in this particular case, there is no
circumstance when the condition in remark 3 is satisfied (as f 0ðÞ50). As a
consequence, we never see the perverse reaction to competitors price
changes in the interior of the interval.
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Proposition 6: If p^s  Uða; bÞ; fp1; p2g 2 ½a; b \ ½c;mð Þ [ fmg
This effectively mean that prices are confined to the intersection between
the ½a; b and ½c;m intervals, and can also take the value of m even if it is
not included in the intersection. The proof of the proposition is as follows.
Proof: First, note that prices will never go neither above m (as it implies
no sales and thus zero revenues) nor below c (as it implies negative prof-
its). Therefore, if a< c prices will never be charged in the interval ½a; cÞ. At
the other end of the interval, if b>m, prices still have to bounded from
above by m. On the other hand, if b<m, it does not make any sense to
charge prices in interval ðb;mÞ. To see this consider producers incentives
for charging prices less then m. This is for making some of the shared first
entrants buy in his shop. However, if the price he charges is above b his
aim is not reached, as everybodys threshold is still lower than the price.
Therefore, it is strictly better for the producer to charge m instead and
extract higher revenues from shared second entrants and captives. 
The proposition above has one degenerate case.
Corollary 1: If p^s  Uða; bÞ and ½a; b \ ½c;m 21; p15p25m
In such a degenerate case, it is obvious that changes neither in the aver-
age risk-taking behavior nor in heterogeneity will affect equilibrium prices
in this situation.4 This is, clearly, not a very interesting scenario to discuss.
A more interesting case is the instance where ½c;m \ ½a; b is not empty.
In principle there are two different constellations for each end of the inter-
val. At the lower end, we can have a> c or a  c. At the upper end, we can
have b<m or b  m. The condition at the lower end of the intersection of
the interval does not affect the subsequent analysis. The condition at the
top end, does introduce slight differences in terms of reaction functions.
However, all the qualitative results are similar between the b<m and b
 m cases. For the slight advantage in tractability and considerable advan-
tage in terms of economic meaningfulness, in what follows we concentrate
on the case of b<m. The case b  m implies that there are consumers who
have so high thresholds that they would buy the product in the first shop
they enter even if the price was high than their budget. Which, clearly does
not make much economic sense.
4 Here, an in subsequent discussions, we abstract from the possibility that altering mean and/
or variance of p^s distribution will alter the conditions for the existence of a given equilibrium.
This alteration might imply that the system will move from one equilibrium to another, which
might also imply changes in prices.
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Based on condition (2) we can calculate the reaction function of firm i.
This will have two difference instances. When the opponent is charging
the price in the interior of the intersection between ½c;m and ½a; b. In this
case
pi jpj<m5
ð112uiÞðb2aÞ1c1pj
2
(6)
The other instance is then the opponent is charging m. In this case, the
optimal price is
pi jpj5m5
ð212uiÞðb2aÞ1c1a
2
:5 (7)
Notice that in equilibrium we will never have an instance when firm 2 is
charging monopolistic price, while firm 1 reacts with (7). This is similar to
the situation with homogeneous consumers that we discussed in previous
section, and is due to our assumption U1 > U2. Because of this assump-
tion, firm 1 will always have more incentive to charge the monopolistic
price. If in any situation firm 2 charges m, firm 1s only optimal response
will always be to also charge m. However, we can have an equilibrium setup
where firm 1 is charging m, while firm 2 is charging the price given by the
equation (7).
Similar to the case with homogeneous consumers, we will have three dif-
ferent types of equilibria: (1) when both firms charge m; (2) when both
firms charge prices in the interior of the interval; (3) when firm 1 charges
m, while firm 2 charges the price in the interior of ða; bÞ \ ðc;mÞ.
Proposition 7: If the parameters of the model are such that
1
21u2
 ðm2cÞ  121 12 u21 14 a2cb2a  ð11u2Þðb2aÞ1 a2c2 , then p15p25m is an
equilibrium of the game.
Proof: For p15p

25m to be an equilibrium it is sufficient to ensure that
firm 2 not to have incentive to jump to charging the price in the interior.
When both firm charge m, firm 2 profits are S21U2
 ðm2cÞ. On the other
hand, profits in case of the jump can be calculated using the reaction function
(7). In this case, firm 2s profits would be S2 12u21
1
2
a2c
b2a
 
1

U2Þ ð11u2Þðb2aÞ1 a2c2
 
. Setting the latter to be no greater than the former
results in the condition given in the proposition. 
5 Notice that in case if b  m; pi jpj5m5
ð112uiÞðb2aÞ1c1m
2 .
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This type of equilibrium is similar to the degenerate case we have dis-
cussed above. Due to the fact that both firms fix prices to the monopolistic
level and therefore concentrating in extracting maximum revenues from
captives and second entrant shared consumers, we see no price changes nei-
ther due to changing mean, not variance of the threshold distributions.
Proposition 8: If 13
b2a
m2c  3110u118u213c=ðb2aÞð314u112u2Þ2 , then p

i5c1ðb2aÞ
11 4ui12uj3
 
for i; j5f1; 2g and i 6¼ j is the equilibrium.
Proof: For both firms to charge the price in the interior it is sufficient
to ensure that the firm 1 does not have an incentive to jump to charging
the monopolistic price m. In the proposed equilibrium setup firm 1s prof-
its are given by Sðb2aÞ18 ð314u112u2Þ2, while if it decided to charge m, it
would earn Sðm2cÞ6 3110u118u21
3c
b2a
 
. Setting the latter to be no greater
than the former results in the condition given in the proposition. 
Type (ii) equilibrium discussed in the proposition above is more interesting
than type (i). Prices in this case do depend on the actual distribution of thresh-
olds. To derive implications of the distributional changes note that changes in
mean and variance are intricately related in case of uniform distribution. We
have to keep this in mind as when we want to examine the effects of the change
in the mean of the distribution, we have to make sure that the variance of the
distribution stays unchanged. And on the contrary, when we want to examine
the changes in brought by the changes in variance, we have to make sure that
the mean of the distribution stays constant. Hence, the changes in the mean
can be understood in changing parameter b (alternatively a), but these changes
have to be counter-balanced by similar changes in parameter a (alternatively b)
so that b—a stays constant. On the other hand, the change in the variance can
be also understood by changing b (alternatively a), while imposing mirroring
changes in a (alternatively b), in order to keep b1 a constant.
Remark 4: In case of type (ii) equilibrium, changing the average value of
the price-acceptance threshold does not have an effect on prices. However,
increasing the heterogeneity in threshold distribution drives the prices up.
This is easy to see if we simply look at the equilibrium prices. These pri-
ces depend on b2 a. Therefore, increasing the mean with constant variance
will not change this price. Which increasing variance would directly imply
increasing b2 a. It is clear that @p

i
@ðb2aÞ > 0, therefore, higher variance
implies, higher equilibrium prices. In order to understand the intuition
behind these results recall the two mechanisms for profit generation in the
no return option setup. One is to exploit captives and second entrants by
higher price, the other is to increase the consumer base using the lower
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price. Thus, there are incentives to decrease, as well as incentives to increase
the price in response to the price change by the competitor.
In light of this discussion, consider the type (ii) equilibrium. When prices
are low, the mass of the p^s distribution to the left of p2 is small. The reason
for setting the price low is to retain as many first entrants as possible (this is
measured by Fðp1Þ). The reason for setting the price high is to exploit the
second entrants that have rejected the offer from firm 2 (measured by
12Fðp2Þ). Consider how the magnitude of these incentives changes with
increasing b2 a. Higher r implies that more mass of the distribution is con-
centrated to the left of the p2 (and potentially to the left of p1).
6 This gives
an extra incentive to increase the price and take advantage of the (marginal-
ly lower number of) first entrants and the large number of second entrants
that have rejected the offer from firm 2. This is the reason why the larger
consumer heterogeneity implies higher prices at low price equilibrium.
Proposition 9: If ð11u2Þðb2aÞ1 a2c2
 2  ð11u2Þðm2cÞðb2aÞ and
11u212u11 a2cb2a
 ðm2cÞ  11u11u21 52 c2ab2a  11u11 12 u2 ðb2aÞ2 c2a4 ,
then p15m and p

25ð11u2Þðb2aÞ1 c1a2 is the equilibrium of the game.
Proof: For this setup to be an equilibrium we need firm 1 not to have
an incentive to jump to the interior, and firm 2 not to have an incentive
to jump to m. In the equilibrium setup the profits are
p15
S
2
11u21
1
2
c2a
b2a

 
1U1

 
ðm2cÞ
and
p25
S
2
11u22
1
2
c2a
b2a

 
1U2

 
ð11u2Þðb2aÞ2 c2a2
 
:
However, in case of jumps respective profits will be
p15
S
2
12u11
1
2
u21
5
4
c2a
b2a

 
1U1

 
11u11
1
2
u2

 
ðb2aÞ2 c2a
4

 
and
p25
S
2
1U2

 
ðm2cÞ
6 Note that low price equilibrium will usually be lower than the mean of the distribution.
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Setting the latter values to be no greater than corresponding former values
results in conditions in the proposition. 
In type (iii) equilibrium only firm 2s price can change as firm 1 charges
the monopolistic price.
Remark 5: The equilibrium price of firm 2 increases with the increase of
both, the average value of the price acceptance threshold and the degree
of heterogeneity in the threshold distribution.
In order to demonstrate this remark lets take the mean of the distribu-
tion first. The distribution mean is linearly related to a that appears in the
equilibrium price equation. However, we have to ensure that b2 a is con-
stant. Therefore, the sign of the @p

2
@a jðb2aÞ5const will give us the indication to
what happens to prices in equilibrium with the increase of the average
threshold. @p

2
@a jðb2aÞ5const5 12 > 0, which means that prices in equilibrium
increase with the mean threshold value.
In order to understand the intuition behind this result, notice that this
happens as the first firm charges the monopolistic price. So, effectively only
firm 2s prices increase in equilibrium. As consumers start accepting higher
and higher prices at the first shop they enter, firm 2 has extra incentive to
increase the price and extract higher returns for the consumer base.
Now turn to the effect of the heterogeneity in risk attitudes. In order to
increase variance in threshold distribution while keeping the mean of the
distribution constant we have to increase b with a small value () and
decrease the value of a with by the same value at the same time. Thus, we
can compare the equilibrium price when when thresholds are distributed
uniformly on the interval ½a; b, to an equilibrium price when thresholds are
distributed on the interval ½a2; b1. Plugging the latter interval bound-
aries in the equilibrium price given by the proposition 9, and applying
some algebra we obtain that the p205p21 314u22 . As 314u22  > 0, we con-
clude that with increasing consumer heterogeneity the prices in equilibrium
increase. This is a similar result as the one discussed in remark 4 and
occurs essentially for the same reason we outlined above.
Even though the analysis with uniform distribution is restrictive, it has
an important advantage (besides allowing the derivation of closed-form sol-
utions to reaction functions). It gives us an opportunity to discuss the
implications of the model with respect to the discontinuity in the best
response function in a general setting. Consider the condition (5), together
with the implicit condition that pj 2 ½c;m. In order to identify the point
where reaction function has a discrete jump, we can calculate the difference
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pi 2p
m
i . Then this value is negative, the producer is better of charging the
monopolistic price.
Using our specific case of the uniform distribution, we can calculate the
value of pi 2p
m
i . Using the reaction function (6),
pi 2p
m
i 5S
ð11uiÞðb2aÞ1pj2c
 
pj2c2uiðb2aÞ
 
4ðb2aÞ 2
S
2
1Ui

 
ðm2cÞ (8)
Notice that this equation is quadratic in competitors price. Therefore, the
requirement for the optimal price jump represents the parabola in the case
of the uniform distribution. Naturally, for any arbitrary shape of cutoff dis-
tribution, the requirement on pj for the break in reaction function will be
an inequality on a polynomial (possibly of higher order than 2) of pj. There
are several qualitatively distinct different setups in which the pi 2p
m
i < 0
condition will be satisfied. This will cause a discontinuity in firms reaction
function.
It is interesting to discuss intuitions behind these discontinuities. We can
do this by sticking with the shape of parabola in (not to complicate the
interpretations even further) and considering the condition playing out in
different ways. Figure 2 presents the illustration of seven (out of many)
cases the condition could result in a general setup. We plot the value of pi
2pmi as a function of the competitors price (pj). If this value is negative, it
is optimal for the firm i to charge the monopolistic price.
For the start in the case (iii) parabola lies weekly above zero and thus the
equilibria are perfectly described by pi functions. The same is true in the
case (iv). The case (vi) on the other hand implies that the firm i should
charge m no matter the price of the competitor. In this case the firm does
not engage in any kind of price undercutting behavior.
Figure 2. Few of the possible cases of for the pi 2p
m
i condition.
921
The cases (i) and (vii) are more interesting. In the former instance, the
firm charges the monopolistic price if the competitors price is too low. The
latter, the firm charges the monopolistic price if the competitors price is
too high. The reason for why the firm might want to charge the monopolis-
tic price is as follows. If the competitor charges a low price, it retains large
number of shoppers that enter its shop first. In this situation, the continu-
ous reaction function would normally dictate to also charge a low price in
order to maximize the number of retained shoppers. However, if the number
of captives is large enough, the firm might prefer charging m and extracting
the monopolistic profit from captives (and however few shoppers who
escaped the competitor). The reason why the firm might want to charge the
monopolistic price in response to the high price charged by the competitor
is more obvious. The higher the pj, the more shoppers refuse to buy from
the competitor, increasing the temptation of the firm to jump to m and
charge those shoppers (as well as its captives) the highest price possible.
The cases (ii) and (v) demonstrate that intuitions put forward in the pre-
vious paragraph act on relative, rather than absolute scale. In case (v), the
firm charges m in response to high and low values of the competitors
price, while charging pi < m for the intermediate values of pj. The case (ii)
is the opposite of the case (v), here the monopolistic price is charged for in
response to the intermediate values of the competitors price. The differ-
ence between the two cases can be explained by the relative number of cap-
tives (ui). Consider two firms. The first with the low share of captives, the
second with the high share of captives. If the competitor charges too low
price (thus retains many shoppers who enter his shop first), the first firm
will have an incentive to charge m in order to extract profit from captives.
For the second firm, however, this might not be optimal. It might be forced
to charge the low price aiming at retaining more shoppers. As the competi-
tor increases the price, the first firm might see the value from competing as
now more and more shoppers pass by the competitors shop. Thus, putting
effort on retaining some of the shoppers that enter its shop first might pay
off. In the similar situation, the second firm might have an incentive to
monetize the shoppers that refused to buy from the competitor together
with its captives. As competitors price hikes even higher, reposes from the
two firms could very well be contrasting again.
Now recall that in the general case the function pi 2p
m
i need not be a
parabola. If it is a polynomial of higher order, it might cross from positive
to negative area and back few times on interval ½c;m. This will depend on
the distribution of p^s, as well as parameter values, and notably the share of
captives for the firm. Implied jumps to the monopolistic price and back
can be explained by the intuitions outlined above.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have extended the classical duopolistic price competition
setup to include captive consumers. This clearly adds to the realism of the
model as not every consumer in the economy will have a chance to choose
between competing suppliers. This starkly changes the equilibrium out-
comes of the model. Addition of captives presents the firms with the
opportunity to extract monopolistic profit. This dis-equilibrates the classi-
cal outcome of marginal cost pricing and makes the game discontinuous.
In case of pricing at marginal cost firm extracts zero profits. As long as the
firm has at least one captive, it is strictly better off to charging the monop-
olistic price and giving up competing for shoppers. As a result, the likely
price dynamics in the economy is the one where starting from the monopo-
listic price the firms undercut each-other driving price gradually down,
until one of them jumps back to the monopolistic price. The competitor
follows and the loop starts over. However, we have also shown that if one
of the firms has large share of captives he might not be motivated to
engage in competition for shoppers at all. In this case equilibrium emerges.
This equilibrium is very different from the equilibrium implied by the mod-
el without captives. In our case, the firm with the most captives charges the
monopolistic price m, while the competitor charges just under m.
Next, we have altered the behavior of shoppers and modeled them as
performing the price search in an environment where they cannot go back
to the shop they have already visited to make the purchase. This changes
many things in the model significantly. Effectively this forces shoppers to
make the decision on where to buy the product under incomplete informa-
tion. If the shopper decides not to buy in the first shop she enters, she is
taking a gamble on the competitors price. Consumers risk-attitude comes
into play. The distribution summarizing shoppers risk attitudes becomes
the central technical hurdle. Due to the discontinuity of the game, the equi-
librium analysis for an arbitrary distribution becomes impossible.
Instead we have proceeded with the analysis of the case when the distri-
bution is uniform. This setup allows for the analytic solution and yields
surprisingly deep insight into the general conclusions of the model. In this
environment firms need not necessarily respond monotonically to the com-
petitors behavior. In this setup, firms have the incentive to increase the
price in order to capture higher profits from captives, but now they also
have an incentive to decrease the price in order to persuade higher number
of shoppers to make the purchase from their shop. From the economic
standpoint, it is the interplay between these two incentives makes the game
discontinuous.
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We have also looked at the implications of the heterogeneity in consumer
risk attitudes on equilibrium prices in duopolistic setup. We have found,
somewhat surprisingly, that the higher variance in consumer risk attitudes
implies higher prices in equilibrium in most of the cases. This points to the
fact that few of the risk-taking consumers might push the duopolistic price
competition into the equilibrium where all consumers, captives and shop-
pers alike, are exploited by the sellers.
APPENDIX
OPTIMALITY OF THE THRESHOLD APPROACH
We demonstrate the optimality of the threshold approach by assuming the
specific shape of the utility function which we have introduced in footnote
1. However, intuitions hold for general form of utility function that satis-
fies requirements outlined in the text. The only necessary condition is that
the utility function has to be continuous in price of the product.
When there is no return option consumer solves his maximization problem
in the first shop he enters. In this situation, he knows p1, but does not know
p2. He has two options: either to buy from this shop and have utility
Vs;15v1m2p1, or to pass on the opportunity and have utility Vs;25v1m2p2.
In this situation, he is taking a gamble. Denote the conditional probability that
the second shop charges higher price by P5Probðp2  p1jp1Þ. This implies
that ProbðVs;2  Vs;1jp1Þ512P. As competitors know level of m, prices for
both of the firms are pi 2 ½c;m. Then as set of potential prices in the second
shop is compact, it must be true that @P=@p1 > 0 8p1.
Now we introduce two more parameters. Denote the expectation of the
price the consumer s would have if she were told that the second shop was
charging the lower price by as, and the expectation of the price she would
have if she was told the other shop was charging higher price by bs. By
assumption as < p1 < bs. When she does not have additional signal wheth-
er the other shop is charging higher or lower price, the utility she expects
from passing on the option to buy the product in the first shop can be
written as
EðVs;2jp1Þ5Pðv1m2asÞ1ð12PÞðv1m2bsÞ (9)
which can be rewritten as
EðVs;2jp1Þ5v1m2½Pas1ð12PÞbs (10)
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Equation (10) and property @P=@p1 > 0 together imply that EðVs;2jp1Þ=
@p1 > 0.
Then as p1 goes up, the utility of immediate purchase goes down, while
expected utility of waiting goes up. As out functions are continuous (in
p1), fixed point theorem implies that there must exist a threshold
p^15½Pas1ð12PÞbs. When p1 goes above this threshold it is optimal for
the consumer to take a risk of buying the product in the second shop,
while as long as p1 < p^1 it is optimal to jump at the opportunity in the
first shop. Now, level of the threshold is consumer specific. It is determined
by the probability function each consumer uses to derive the expectations
about whether the price will be above or lower than the price in the first
shop and by the conditional probabilities each consumer uses to derive
expectations about the actual price she thinks she will see in the shop.
REFERENCES
Barron, J. M., Taylor, B. A., Umbeck, J. R. (2004): Number of sellers, average prices, and
price dispersion, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, pp. 1041–66.
Baye, M. R., Morgan, J., Scholten, P. (2004): Price dispersion in the small and in the large:
Evidence from an internet price comparison site, Journal of Industrial Economics, 52,
pp. 463–96.
Benhabib, J., Bull, C. (1983): Job search: The choice of intensity, Journal of Political Econo-
my, 91, pp. 747–64.
Bloch, P. H., Sherrell, D. L., Ridgway, N. M. (1986): Consumer search: An extended frame-
work, Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (1), pp. 119–26.
Blume, L. E., Easley, D., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, E. (2009): Trading networks with price-setting
agents, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, pp. 36–50.
Corominas-Bosch, M. (2004): Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 115, pp. 35–77.
Dasgupta, P., Maskin, E. (1986): The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic
games, I: Theory, Review of Economic Studies, 53, pp. 1–26.
Kohn, M. G., Shavell, S. (1974): The theory of search, Journal of Economic Theory, 9, pp.
93–123.
Kranton, R. E., Minehart, D. F. (2001): A theory of buyer-seller networks. The American
Economic Review, 91, pp. 485–508.
Lever, C. (2011). Price competition on a buyer-seller network. Technical report, Banco de
Mexico.
Manning, R., Morgan, P. B. (1982): Search and consumer theory, The Review of Economic
Studies, 49, pp. 203–16.
Mehta, N., Rajiv, S., Srinivasan, K. (2003): Price uncertainty and consumer search: A struc-
tural model of consideration set formation, Marketing Science, 22 (1), pp. 58–84.
Morgan, P., Manning, R. (1985): Optimal search, Econometrica, 53, pp. 923–44.
Pasini, G P. Pin, S., Weidenholzer, (2008). Network model of price dispersion. Technical
report, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Reny, P. (1999): On the existence of pure and mixes strategy nash equilibria in discontinuous
games, Econometrica, 67, pp. 1029–56.
925
Salop, S., Stiglitz, J. (1977): Bargains and ripoffs: A model of monopolistically competitive
price dispersion, The Review of Economic Studies, 44, pp. 493–510.
Salop, S., Stiglitz, J. (1982): The theory of sales: A simple model of equilibrium price disper-
sion with identical agents, The American Economic Review, 72, pp. 1121–30.
Stahl, D. O. (1996): Oligopolistic pricing with heterogeneous consumer search, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, pp. 243–68.
Stigler, G. J. (1961): The economics of information, The Journal of Political Economy, 69, pp.
213–25.
Varian, H. R. (1980): A model of sales, The American Economic Review, 70, pp. 651–9.
Wilde, L. L., Schwartz, A. (1979): Equilibrium comparison shopping, The Review of Econom-
ic Studies, 46, pp. 543–53.
926
